Quote of the day

Quote or rather passage of the day by Daniel Sacilotto on the possibility of new transcendental epistemology, depurated from its metaphysical and anthropocentric prejudices:

"Yes, Kantian epistemology was already metaphysically contaminated. But should it follow from this that epistemology must be without exception laden by dogmatic assumptions? Or is it possible to think of an epistemology depurated from its metaphysical prejudices, as necessarily propaedeutic to ontological speculation? Yes, Kantian epistemology and its subsequent radicalization in the Continental tradition exacerbated anthropocentrism and the myopia of thought in relation to the expanses of a cosmos indifferent to our interests. But should it follow from this that every epistemology must, necessarily, be destined to anthropocentrism, trapped to the confines of thought, ideas or appearances? Or is it possible to resist the anti-realist fate assigned to epistemology and to say, instead, that it is possible to reconcile critique with a realism through which we would understand the conditions of possibility for thought insofar as it represents a reality foreign to itself? Yes, the hermeneutic and deconstructive inquiry into the history of Western metaphysics reveals the lingering reduction of being to presence as substance which initiates the ‘ontotheological’ derail. But does it follow that every metaphysical attempt will be destined to such ‘essentialism’, or that it must forever indulge in a metaphysics of presence impervious to the problematic of time? Or is it possible to reject the Platonist and Aristotelian hypostasis of substance and of essence, in sight of a future metaphysics within which process and dynamicity are inherent to the thought of being?" 

(Daniel Sacilotto, "On Philosophical Methodology: A Sellarsian Look at the Analytic/Continental Divide")

O kontingenciji u znanosti i životu

"Moja je rana postojala prije mene: ne transcendencija rane kao viša aktualnost,

nego njezina imanencija kao virtualnost uvijek unutar miljea (ravni ili polja)."

(Gilles Deleuze/Jöe Bousquet) 

Sjećam se rečenice koju je nedavno izgovorio liječnik na mojem izlasku iz ambulante, govoreći o jednoj ozlijedi koju sam pretrpio: "Tako je i tako mora ostati."

Ali ne mora tako ostati, pomislio sam. 

Ne samo da nas život uči da ništa ne mora ostati takvim kakvim jest, nego i sam razvoj znanosti, a ponajbolje se to vidi možda baš u medicini, pokazuje da nešto ne mora ostati takvim kakvim jest ili kakvim je postalo.* Ponajbolje o tome svjedoči da se neke bolesti uzrokovane genskim poremećajem koje su se nekad smatrale neizlječivima, to jest koje su se, filozofski rečeno, uzimale kao nešto dano (nešto s čime ste naprosto rođeni/došli na svijet), danas mogu liječiti.** Zato mislim da je svako inzistiranje na nužnosti u znanostima života kakva je medicina nepoželjno jer se ono u krajnjoj liniji ne oslanja na znanstvenu spoznaju nego na religijsko/metafizičko shvaćanje svijeta. 

Čini se da život u svojoj virtualnoj dimenziji posjeduje velik regenerativni potencijal koji se međutim u velikom broju vrsta ne aktivira/aktualizira sam od sebe. Znanost nam međutim danas otvara mogućnost da određenim tipom intervencije potaknemo/aktiviramo te regenerativne potencijale.  Time se ne želi reći da se život može vratiti (u doslovnom smislu) u stanje prije bolesti ili ozlijede, jer bi to u konačnici zahtijevalo vraćanje vremena, ali to uopće ne znači da oblici regeneracije nisu mogući. Ne radi se dakle o povratku na staro, nego o stvaranju novog koje po izgledu i funkcijama nalikuje starome. 

Pitanje je dakako, kad je riječ o kontingenciji, gdje povlačimo granicu. Jedna je stvar tvrditi da je sve što se događa u životu kontingnento, a posve je druga stvar tvrditi da su i sami prirodni (fizikalni) zakoni kontingnenti. Otud moje neslaganje s filozofskom pozicijom Quentina Meillassouxa (vidi moj prikaz knjige). Jednostavno smatram da samo zato što možemo misliti kontingenciju apsolutno svega (apsolutnu kontingenciju) na logički dosljedan način ne znači da takvo mišljenje donosi išta za znanost, politiku ili estetiku. U tom sam pogledu skloniji filozofiji Henryja Bergsona i Gillesa Deleuzea koji su smatrali da je sve što se događa u životu kontingnentno (podložno promjenama), ne dovodeći time u pitanje nužnost fizikalnih zakona... 

* Štoviše, ne sastoji li se sam razvoj znanosti u konstantnom pokazivanju da je ono što se dotad smatralo nužnim zapravo kontingentno?

** Za primjer vidi ovdje.

On the difference between transcendent and immanent happiness

In the Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture has recently been published my first essay written in English (see here). The text was written on the invitation of the organizers of the School for Politics and Critique which was held in Skopje (both online and in-person) from 10th to 12th of September.

The text discusses Andrea Long Chu's writings on gender and gender transition, but more specifically on the role of desire in both formation of gender and in the process of gender transition. I won't go further into the text. Instead, I will just pause a little bit on the notion of happiness as something transcendent which is contained in footnote no. 20. I would like to clarify a little bit what I meant by that and also provide a distinction between that kind of happiness (which is transcendent) and immanent happiness, the distinction which escaped me while I was writing the essay.

In short, I do not think that all happiness is transcendent as might be concluded from the essay, but I do think that the kind of happiness which Chu implies in her text "My New Vagina Won't Make Me Happy" is indeed transcendent to her desire to become a woman. So, what do I mean by the transcendent happiness for which I say that it is "attached from the outside (as a signifier) to a certain psychic/bodily state". Easiest to understand it would be to say that it is happiness on which we think when someone asks us are we happy. It is happiness that is always enunciated by the statement "I am happy" or some similar statement. When we say to ourselves or the other that we are happy, happiness is attached to our current condition by the signifier. This is transcendent happiness. It usually appears in the form of the question: would I be happy if I did this/that, will this make me happy, etc. To provide concrete examples; when we ask ourselves whether we would be happy if we had a partner, if we lived in a different town, or, as in Chu's case, if we change our sex, we are thinking of transcendent happiness. 

However, there is also immanent happiness, happiness that is immanent to life and desire. In contrast to the former happiness, this happiness is rarely enunciated and even if it is, this doesn't have any effect on it. This is happiness that just comes to us (happens to us) without us asking for it. For example, when we are with our partner, when we are running (or playing some other sport), playing/singing our favorite song, etc., happiness might just suddenly come to us and overwhelm us. This is immanent happiness. It is lived and not enunciated. But then, is this happiness not what we call joy?! 

Best novels read in 2020.

Here is the list of the best novels I read last year, some of them for the first time and some of them for the second time. Unfortunately, I haven't read many novels, let alone good or great novels last year, because I was writing a lot, so the list is scarce. The order of the novels is random. 

Luka Bekavac: Drenje (2011)

J.G. Ballard: Crash (1973)

Italo Svevo: Zeno's Conscience (1923)

Janko Polić Kamov: Isušena kaljuža (1909)

Henry Miller: Tropic of Cancer (1934)

Why I don't like New Year(s)

What is modernity (what are its defining features) and whether we still live one is a complex question. Over the last few years, I have been changing my opinion when it comes to the question if there is a single line (of progress) that can be deduced from the history of humanity. However, what I know modernity definitely isn't is this stupid yearning for the new (new understood simply as whatever comes next in the ever-shifting present) which finds one of its most vivid expressions in a cult of the New Year. 

My attitude toward New Year is summed up in the following line: 

"let the boys all sing and the boys all shout for tomorrow"

So, if this denouncement of the old (past) and embracement of the new (future) which we witness in the cult of the New Year - but where both past and future are understood merely as variations of the present (present that is gone and present that is about to come) - is what (being) "contemporary" means, then I would rather go underground!